

TOP SECRET
IAC-D-57/1
S-E-C-R-E-T

1 May 1953

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

28 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATION

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem on NIE-47, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia," NIE-55/1, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea," and NIE-58, "Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses."

REFERENCE: Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies in NIE's, dated 3 June 1952

ENCLOSURE: A. List of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in the Preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1 and 58

1. On 16 December 1952, the IAC representatives held a post-mortem meeting on NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58.

2. The IAC representatives noted that:

a. Steps taken by the IAC agencies as a result of the post-mortem on SE-27 ("Probable Effects of Various Possible Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China," dated 5 June 1952) are beginning to result in better coverage of economic questions.

b. Many of the deficiencies encountered in the preparation of NIE-47, NIE-55/1, and NIE-58 are obvious weaknesses which the IAC agencies are currently trying to correct. In other cases the gaps may well be "unknowable."

c. Nevertheless, a further study of the intelligence weaknesses in these estimates may assist the efforts made by collection and research activities coping with these and related problems.

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3. The IAC representatives have agreed on a list of the more important current deficiencies in our intelligence (Enclosure A).

4. Recommendation

That the collection agencies of the intelligence community review their priorities in the light of the findings of the IAC representatives as set forth in Enclosure A.

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D/Asst. Director/Adm.
National Estimates

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ENCLOSURE "A"

LIST OF INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN THE PREPARATION
OF NIE's 47, 55/1 AND 58
(in order of priority)

Several intelligence deficiencies were revealed in the preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1 and 58. These deficiencies are of varying degree and importance. For the most part, they are related to three general questions:

- a. Sino-Soviet support of the war effort in Korea;
- b. The nature of certain attitudes within Communist China;
- c. The nature of Sino-Soviet political relations.

Outlined below are specific points on which NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58 were weakened by the lack of adequate intelligence.

A. The Sino-Soviet War Effort in Korea

*1. What are Communist intentions with respect to an armistice in Korea? Is there any divergence of view, Chinese and Soviet, on this question?

2. What is the Sino-Soviet capability to support: (a) intensified hostilities in Korea, and (b) a general war in the Far East?

*a. Communist military stockpiles. Where are Soviet Far East stockpiles located, and what is their level? To what extent does Soviet support of the Korean war entail a drain upon Soviet Far East stockpiles? Upon Soviet Far East production? Upon shipments from Communist Europe? How large, and where, are Communist China's aviation POL stockpiles?

* There is little or no reliable intelligence at present on these questions. Despite recognized collection difficulties, more reliable intelligence is essential to the production of meaningful estimates.

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*b. Chinese Communist military production. Of POL? Of munitions? Of transport equipment?

**c. The effect to date of the Korean war. On the viability of the Chinese Communist economy? On the rehabilitation and expansion of productive capacity? On the economic dependence upon the USSR, and on the terms under which Communist China receives military and economic aid from the USSR?

**d. What is the amphibious capability of the Soviet Far East forces?

*3. What is the role of the Soviet Air Force in the Korean war and the CCAF? What combat experience have CCAF pilots actually had? What degree of combat proficiency have CCAF pilots demonstrated in Korea?

**4. What staff responsibility relationships exist in the joint Sino-Soviet military direction of the Korean war?

**5. What trends exist in Communist China's armed force mobilization programs? Are the armed forces growing larger, smaller, or remaining static in their numerical strength?

B. Popular Attitudes within Communist China

**1. What attitudes exist within the CCP, the Army, and the general population regarding:

a. Support of the regime?

b. The USSR? US? Japan? Chinese Nationalists?

**2. How important are such attitudes? To what extent must the regime consider them in determining and implementing policy?

** Some intelligence is available on these questions, but the receipt of more reliable information and an augmentation of analytical effort would enable the IAC to make better estimates than is now possible.

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C. The Nature of Sino-Soviet Political Relations

*1. The influence which the USSR exerts in the key centers of the Chinese Communist regime.

a. In the regime's security agencies? Army? Party? Government? Economy?

b. What key personalities in the regime, if any, may be said to be "Moscow men"?

**2. The influence (political, economic and military) which the USSR exerts in the border areas of Communist China.

a. What is the nature of political relations among Communist China, the USSR, and Outer Mongolia?

b. What influence does the USSR (or Outer Mongolia) exert in Manchuria? in Inner Mongolia? in Sinkiang?

**3. The relationships which exist between Communist China and the USSR concerning primary influence in:

a. The Communist doctrine of revolution in Asia?

b. The strategic direction of Communist activities in Southeast Asia? in Japan? in North Korea?

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